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Abstract
Based on three common interpretive commitments in general relativity, I raise a
conceptual problem for the usual identification, in that theory, of timelike curves as
those that represent the possible histories of (test) particles in spacetime. This prob-
lem affords at least three different solutions, depending on different representational
and ontological assumptions one makes about the nature of (test) particles, fields, and
their modal structure. While I advocate for a cautious pluralism regarding these op-
tions, I also suggest that re-interpreting (test) particles as field processes offers the
most promising route for natural integration with the physics of material phenomena,
including quantum theory.
1 Events and Worldlines
According to the general theory of relativity, the mathematical models of spacetime are,
broadly construed, the Lorenzian manifolds (M, gab).
1 Each M is a smooth, Hausdorff, con-
nected, four-dimensional manifold, and each gab is a smooth metric field of Lorentz signature
(1, 3) on M . The points of M are interpreted as events : structureless, fundamental hap-
penings or potential happenings without temporal or spatial extension. The field gab acts
in many roles. In the present context, there are two most salient. First is its smooth par-
tition of the elements ξa of the tangent space at each point in M into three classes: the
timelike, null, and spacelike vectors (for which, respectively, gabξ
aξb > 0, gabξ
aξb = 0, and
gabξ
aξb < 0). Second is its assignment of a magnitude to each non-spacelike and spacelike
C1 curve γ : I → M , with tangent vector ξa and I an open interval of R, of the value∫
I
|gabξaξb|1/2ds. (Recall that a curve is (non-)spacelike when its tangent vector field is ev-
erywhere (non-)spacelike.) Typically, the piecewise smooth timelike curves are taken to be
all and only the worldlines for possible (test) particles, representing their potential histories,
and the (possibly broken) null geodesics (of the Levi-Civita connection compatible with gab)
to be those of possible light rays. I shall provide some comments on each of these in turn.
1 I have set aside the energy-momentum tensor Tab; according to Einstein’s field equation, it is determined
according to Tab = (c
4/8piG)(Rab− 12Rgab), where c is the speed of light, G is Newton’s constant, and Rab and
R are, respectively, the Ricci and scalar curvatures associated with the Levi-Civita connection compatible
with gab.
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1.1 Events
Events are the subject of interpretation not just in spacetime theories, but in metaphysics
more generally. Philosophical accounts of events have taken that category as more expansive
in content than is intended here, where “By an event we mean an idealized occurrence in
the physical world having extension in neither space nor time” [20, p. 3]. Among traditional
metaphysicians, by contrast events (potentially) encompass anything that happens, such as
“Smiles, walks, dances, weddings, explosions, hiccups, hand-waves, arrivals and departures,
births and deaths, thunder and lightning” [7]. By contrast with the structureless events
represented by the points of a manifold, which have no proper parts, events in this broader
sense include processes with positive duration that extend over space. That’s not to say
that there is consensus on what exactly delimits this content, or its metaphysical status in
relation with spatiotemporal regions, properties, objects, processes, and facts—see Meyer
[33, §2.2] for a review of various positions—but rather that this content in any case outstrips
those without temporal or spatial extension.
The concept of event as used in spacetime theories claims little with respect to most of
these issues:
We use “event” as a neutral term here and intend no special significance. Some
might prefer to speak, for example, of “equivalence classes of coincident point
events” or “point event locations.” [30, p. 119n1]
Traditional metaphysical accounts of events allows for distinct coincident (or overlapping)
events. For example, one might describe the decay of a muon and the coincident emission
of a muon neutrino as two separate but coincident events. By contrast, events for spacetime
theories are associated with all mutually coincident events in this former sense.
We regard two events as being “the same” if they coincide, that is, if they “occur
at the same place at the same time.” That is to say, we are not concerned with
how an event is marked—by firecracker or finger-snap—but only with the thing
itself. [20, p. 4]
The decay of the muon and the emission of the muon neutrino would thus be “aspects” of
the same event. (The quotations around “aspects” indicate that I do not intend to commit
at this point to any metaphysical account of the relation between events and coincidence.
I’ll return to this issue in section 4.)
Conversely, traditional metaphysical accounts of events are less modally rich than those in
spacetime theories. They assume that events, whatever they are, are existents: they exist as
actual in some world or other.2 Importantly, and by contrast, an event within spacetime need
not involve any material occurrences of particles at all, as long as it registers the possibility
of an occurrence. On a first examination this may appear paradoxical: the merely possible
occurrence that such an “empty” event registers is actual only in a different world. But
2 Forbes [17] is almost an exception: he takes the temporal order of a (non-relativistic) world to be
modally constructed from actual events and their counterparts in “branching” counterpart worlds—ones
who have initial segments of events that are perfect counterparts (in the sense of Lewisian counterpart
theory [16, 29]). For Forbes [17], therefore, events are still fundamental world-bound existents, while times
are modal constructions therefrom.
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how can something not actually existing be identical with or determine something actually
existing? One resolution is to distinguish constitutive or identity relations from counterpart
and representation relations. An event without material occurrences is not identical with
one in another world therewith, but the two can be put in a correspondence via common
representation by the mathematical model (M, gab) (or by isomorphic such models) [15].
Many distinct general relativistic worlds can thus be represented by the same Lorentzian
manifold (M, gab). So to say that an event represented by a point in M might, but might
not, involve some material occurrence, is to affirm the equal adequacy of the mathematical
model (M, gab) to represent a world in which it does, and a world in which is does not.
Another resolution is to adopt a certain type of field ontology, which I discuss more in
section 4. In any case, though, it seems that one cannot dispense with the modal features
of these events in the context of general relativity. As Geroch [20, p. 4] reports, “Failure to
do so in the present case would, as far as I can see, make further development of the theory
virtually impossible.”
1.2 Worldlines
The previous subsection focused on the interpretation of events in general relativity, revealing
their modal character. Although events are represented by points of the manifold, I implicitly
invoked the spacetime metric gab when I maintained that these points can be understood
as being without temporal or spatial extension. For it is the metric which endows certain
collections of points a magnitude interpreted as physical extension in these senses.
This role for the metric, and the new modal considerations it raises in concert with those
of events, is even more evident when one considers worldlines and what they represent.
Following O’Neill [35, p. 11, ], let γ˜ : I → M , with I an open interval of R, be a smooth
curve in a general relativistic spacetime (M, gab).
Definition 1. A function γ¯ : [a, b]→ M , with [a, b] a closed interval of R, is called a curve
segment when it has a smooth extension to a smooth curve, so that the tangent vector to γ¯
can be uniquely defined at γ¯(a) and γ¯(b).
Definition 2. A function γˆ : [a, b] → M is called a piecewise smooth curve segment when
there is a finite ordered sequence a = t0 < t1 < . . . < tk+1 = b such that γˆ|[ti,ti+1], called a
piece of γˆ, is a curve segment for each i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}.
(Note that any curve segment is a piecewise smooth curve segment.) The spacetime metric
assigns magnitudes to piecewise smooth curve segments with tangent vector ξa in the same
way as to smooth curves, by integrating |gabξaξb|1/2 over each segment and then summing
the integrals together.
Definition 3. A function γ˘ : I → M is said to be a piecewise smooth curve when for any
a, b ∈ I such that a < b, γ˘|[a,b] is a piecewise smooth curve segment.
(Note that any smooth curve is a piecewise smooth curve.) One says that γ˘ contains the
piecewise smooth curve segment γ˘|[a,b].
Two further definitions are needed.
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Definition 4. A smooth curve or curve segment is said to be regular when its tangent vector
never vanishes.
A piecewise smooth curve segment is regular just when its pieces are, and a piecewise smooth
curve is regular just when every piecewise smooth curve segment it contains is regular.
Definition 5. A piecewise smooth curve segment γˆ is said to be oriented just in case
whenever γˆ|[ti,ti+1] and γˆ|[ti+1,ti+2] are two of its pieces, the right and left tangent vectors at
γˆ(ti+1) are co-oriented, i.e., their inner product via the metric gab at this point is positive.
A piecewise smooth curve is oriented just when every piecewise smooth curve segment it
contains is oriented.
Now let γ be any oriented, regular, piecewise smooth curve or curve segment, and con-
sider the interpretive principles for non-spacelike worldlines clearly stated by Malament [30,
pp. 121–2]:3
(C1) γ is timelike iff γ[I] could be the worldline of a point particle with positive mass;
(C2) γ can be reparameterized so as to be a null geodesic iff γ[I] could be the trajectory of
a light ray;
note in both cases the identification of a precise, mathematical class of objects—the images
of certain curves—with physical states of affairs—worldlines and trajectories. Requiring that
a curve be oriented, in the presence or regularity, ensures that the particle represented never
spontaneously changes its local temporal orientation.4
To these interpretive principles Malament introduces several important qualifications and
clarifications. “First, we are here working within the framework of relativity as traditionally
understood and ignoring speculations about the possibility of particles that travel faster than
light” [30, p. 121]. (I shall also ignore such speculations.) In addition, the point particles
mentioned should be understood as test particles, those whose contributions to the energy-
momentum tensor Tab are neglected. This is, of course, an idealization, but an important
one that lies at the heart of the interpretation of general relativity. The last clarification
emphasizes the modality inherent in these interpretive principles and is worth quoting at
length:
the modal character of the assertions (i.e., the reference to possibility) is essential.
It is simply not true—take the case of (C1)—that all images of smooth, timelike
curves are, in fact, the worldlines of massive particles. The claim is that, at least
so far as the laws of relativity theory are concerned, they could be. Of course,
3 Malament assumes that γ is just a regular smooth curve, but notes later that this might be relaxed for
particles undergoing collisions, which is why I have introduced piecewise smooth curves and curve segments;
this restriction indeed makes no substantive difference in understanding the following interpretive princi-
ples. I have also omitted Malament’s footnotes and footnote symbols from the quotation to streamline the
presentation.
4 The role of regularity is to exclude such changes effected by buffering two non-co-oriented curve segments
with a trivial (constant) curve, whose tangent vector vanishes. If one wanted to insist on the non-empty
representational capacities of non-regular curves, then one could exchange regularity for a stronger and more
complicated analog of orientation, but I shall not pursue such an approach here.
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judgments concerning what could be the case depend on what conditions are held
fixed in the background. The claim that a particular curve image could be the
worldline of a massive point particle must be understood to mean that it could
so long as there are, for example, no barriers in the way. Similarly, in (C2) there
is an implicit qualification. We are considering what trajectories are available
to light rays when to intervening material media are present—i.e., when we are
dealing with light rays in vacuo.
Though these . . . concerns are important and raise interesting questions about
the role of idealization and modality in the formulation of physical theory, they
have little to do with relativity theory as such. Similar difficulties arise, for
example, when one attempts to formulate corresponding principles within the
framework of Newtonian gravitation theory. [30, pp. 121–2]
What’s essential for the possible massive particles and light rays in question is that they
can be supposed to interact in as specific a manner with other possible ambient matter as
possible: their worldlines can be traced by the images of the appropriate curves without
disturbing any other feature of the spacetime. In other words, they may be supposed to
evade material interactions with other matter as dictated. This is another sense in which
test bodies and test light rays are idealized.
Malament is right that idealization and modality plays important roles in physical theories
generally, but I demur that there are no differences in general relativity compared with
Newtonian gravitation. The aim of the following section is to show that in fact some novel
issues do arise in relativity theory due to a phenomenon absent from standard Newtonian
theory: closed timelike curves. This leads, in particular, to a re-evaluation of (C1).
2 Implications of Closed Timelike Curves
2.1 Branching Curves
Definition 6. A piecewise smooth timelike curve or curve segment γ : I → M is said to
contain a closed timelike curve (CTC) when there is a subset of γ[I] homeomorphic to S1;
it is said to be a CTC when that subset is all of γ[I].5
Although many physicists—e.g., Hawking and Ellis [24, p. 189]—have expressed unease
about spacetimes with CTCs on account of their leading to logical or causal paradoxes,
I agree with the summary judgment of Earman [12, Ch. 6] that self-consistency of field
solutions is already a feature of all models of general relativity, so the air of paradox has
5 There is some surprising variation in the definition of CTCs in the literature. O’Neill [35, p. 192] focuses
on curve segments γ¯ : [a, b]→M that satisfy γ¯(a) = γ¯(b) and are such that at these two points, their tangent
vectors are non-zero and positively proportional. This rules out non-smooth CTCs. Earman [12, p. 165]
assumes that spacetime is temporally orientable and takes a CTC to be a smooth, future-directed timelike
curve (segment) from some p ∈M to itself. This rules out CTCs from existing in non-temporally orientable
spacetimes. Perhaps there are sound arguments for either of these restrictions, but for present purposes they
are not needed.
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been significantly overblown.6 Perhaps the way these “consistency conditions” manifest in
particular models of the theory is of interest for further research, but I shall take them for
granted in what follows because my discussion is not so dispositive towards any details about
them.
Indeed, the implications to which I wish to draw attention arise not from CTCs per se, but
from certain curves that contain CTCs but are not CTCs themselves. These curves involve a
sort of branching that, given other common interpretative commitments of relativity theory,
entails a kind of conceptual inconsistency. They fall into (at least) one of the following two
classes.
Definition 7. A piecewise smooth timelike curve segment γ : [a, b]→ M is right-branching
when it contains smooth segments γ1 : [a1, b1] → M and γ2 : [a2, b2] → M and there is a
number s0 ∈ [0,min{b1−a1, b2−a2}) such that γ1(a1+s) = γ2(a2+s) and (dγ1/ds)(a1+s) =
(dγ2/ds)(a2 + s) for s ∈ [0, s0] but γ1(a1 + s) 6= γ2(a2 + s) for s ∈ (s0,min{b1 − a1, b2 − a2}].
A piecewise smooth timelike curve is right-branching when it contains a right-branching
piecewise smooth timelike curve segment.7
Definition 8. A piecewise smooth timelike curve segment γ : [a, b] → M is left-branching
when γ(−s) is right-branching.8 A piecewise smooth timelike curve is left-branching when
it contains a left-branching piecewise smooth timelike curve segment.
Both classes consist of curves that contain a CTC with a point at which the image of the
curve is not locally homeomorpic to a line. In particular, the right-branching curves contain
smooth segments that have the same initial point and direction, but different final points,
while the left-branching curves contain smooth segments that have the same final point and
direction, but different initial points.
Definition 9. A curve or curve segment said to be branching (simpliciter) if it is either
right- or left-branching.
Example 1. Consider Minkowski spacetime (R4, ηab) with a global Lorentz chart (t, x, y, z),
and consider the following coordinate expression of a worldline γ : R→ R4:
t(τ) =
{
τ if τ ≤ 0,
(c/A) sinh(Aτ/c) if τ > 0,
(1)
x(τ) =
{
1/A if τ ≤ 0,
(c2/A) cosh(Aτ/c) if τ > 0,
(2)
y(τ) = 0, (3)
z(τ) = 0. (4)
6 Indeed, CTCs appear in a wide variety of general relativistic models used to describe parts of our
universe, such as the interior of Kerr black holes, and (more speculatively) possibly certain wormhole solutions
[12, pp. 168–169].
7 Cf. the definition of bifurcate curves of the first kind in Hajicek [23, p. 158].
8 I use the terms “right-” and “left-branching” rather than “future-” and “past-branching” because there
is no need for the curve’s tangent vectors to be co-oriented with the temporal orientation of the spacetime
into which they map, or even for that spacetime to have a temporal orientation at all.
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At first the particle is unaccelerated, i.e., its worldline is geodesic until the event labeled
(0, 1/A, 0, 0), after which it begins to accelerate at a constant rate A in the x-direction. The
differences in the parameterization τ at different events records the particle’s elapsed proper
time, and c is the speed of light.
Considering the group Z which can act on the spacetime by temporal translation (i.e.,
along t), one can quotient by its group action to produce a Minkowski-like spacetime, “rolled
up” along the t-direction, in which each t-slice has been identified with each t + k-slice, for
every k ∈ Z. Doing so, the resulting action of this quotient on γ yields a right-branching
smooth timelike curve, since, e.g., the curve segments γ1 = γ|[−1,0] and γ2 = γ|[0,1] satisfy
γ1(−1) = γ2(0) = (0, 1/A, 0, 0) and (dγ1/ds)(−1) = (dγ2/ds)(0) = (∂/∂t)a, while γ1(τ−1) =
(0, 1/A, 0, 0) 6= ((c/A) sinh(Aτ/c), (c2/A) cosh(Aτ/c), 0, 0) = γ2(τ) for τ ∈ (0, 1].
Letting β : R→ R be defined as β(τ) = −τ and using instead the curve γ◦β in Minkowski
spacetime, the same construction procedure yields a left-branching smooth timelike curve.
This particular example is not locally homemorphic to the line at (0, 1/A, 0, 0) because
it is “Y-shaped” there, although in general examples branching curves may also have points
at which they are “X-shaped” or some other more general dendrite.
The sense in which branching curves entail a kind of conceptual inconsistency concerns
the incompatibility of the following commitments:
1. The equation of motion for a massive test particle—Newton’s second law—equates the
net force F a it experiences at an event with the product of its mass m and acceleration,
F a = mξb∇bξa, (5)
where ξa is the tangent vector of its worldline at that event and ∇ is the Levi-Civita
derivative operator compatible with the spacetime metric. Thus on any spacetime
region on which the force F a is defined (with appropriate smoothness), the initial
value problem for a particle’s worldline, both in the forward and backward directions,
is well-posed; in particular, there is a unique maximally extended solution for each
initial point and timelike tangent vector at that point [1].
2. Given a spacetime with a fixed collection of test particles worldlines within it, the force
F a on a test particle at an event depends only on its intrinsic properties and its tangent
vector at that event. In other words, there is a single net force that a particle with
particular intrinsic properties and trajectory experiences at any event.
3. Timelike curves represent particle worldlines through their images. These divide up the
events of spacetime into two classes: those at which the particle is present, and those at
which it is not. That’s to say that any two timelike curves with the same images have
the same representational capacities [15] for massive particles: each of them represents
equally well the possible worldline of a particle with particular instrinsic properties.
This reflects in turn a commitment to the idea that the parameterization of a curve is
just a convenient method of describing its image; particular useful parameterizations,
such as those by arc length co-oriented with an ambient temporal orientation, should
in fact be understood as induced on the curve image by the metric.
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The third commitment requires that, if a test particle is present at an event, then its only
feature that can vary at that event is its trajectory (tangent vector). That means in particular
that its intrinsic properties at that event are fixed. The second commitment then entails that
because they are fixed, that particle experiences a determinate net force at that event which
depends only on its trajectory there. It then follows from the first commitment that once the
particle’s trajectory is fixed at that event, so is its entire worldline. Yet, for branching curves,
this is not so: a particle with the same intrinsic properties and initial or final trajectory at
some event has at least two distinct worldline segments at which that event begins or ends,
respectively. To be clear, there is no mathematical contradiction here: the incompatibility
arises from the union of the mathematics of relativity theory with its interpretive principles,
in particular those about the representational structure of timelike worldlines.
2.2 Clarifications and Elaborations
Before continuing in section 3 to outline three substantive resolutions to this inconsistency,
each with its implications for the foundations of relativity theory, I would like to provide
some elaborations on each of the three above commitments, from which together conceptual
inconsistency arises, to forestall some possible initial objections. Indeed, each of the three
requires some qualification, although in most cases relaxing these qualifications plausibly
would not render the three commitments consistent.
For instance, in the first commitment, which involves the uniqueness of solutions to
Newton’s second law, I have set aside considerations involving test particles with instrin-
sic angular momentum, and how that may affect their equation of motion. Yet if those
considerations were re-introduced, they would not mollify the conflict, for once the angu-
lar momentum of a particle is specified in addition to its trajectory at an event, similar
uniqueness theorems for the initial value problem apply [31, 36, 10].
I have also assumed that any net force considered, and the spacetime metric itself, are
sufficiently smooth to satisfy the preconditions of application of these uniqueness theorems.
When those conditions are relaxed, it is possible even for there to be uncountably distinct
geodesics passing through a point with a fixed timelike tangent vector there [14]. That said,
it is not clear that relaxing these conditions would mollify the inconsistency of the three
commitments. Even if a particle’s worldline were not determined from its initial data at a
point, the third commitment seems to demand that there must be a fact of the matter about
what happens to the particle at that event: it follows one worldline through it or another,
but whichever it does numbers exactly one. Otherwise the particle would be undergoing
“fission” in the sense discussed in the philosophical literature on the identity of ordinary
objects over time [19, §4.7]: one particle evolves into two copies with the same intrinsic
properties (or perhaps into one particle that is multilocated [21, §6], depending on one’s
metaphysics). But if a particle can undergo fission while its worldline contains a CTC, it is
unclear why it couldn’t when it doesn’t. To model this requires abandoning the idea that
woldlines are represented by the images of curves—maps from some real interval into the
spacetime manifold—instead of the images of (say) an arbitrary dendrite. Finally, although
we are considering test particles, countenancing their fission seems to violate the spirit of
energy conservation.
As an aside: The considerations of the prior paragraph reveal why the conceptual incon-
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sistency arises for test particles and not light rays. When there is a unique solution to the
initial value problem, the branching phenomenon for a worldline can only arise if the different
branches experience different forces. In particular, if one is a geodesic, the other cannot be.9
While non-geodesic timelike curves can represent test particles undergoing forced motion,
non-geodesic null curves cannot be interpreted as free light rays at all.10 Because there are
no representational commitments with non-geodesic null curves, they cannot figure in an
analogous argument about conceptual inconsistency.
Turning now to the second commitment, one sees that it amounts to the observation that
forces on test particles are always single-valued. This is hardly controversial, and coheres with
the prohibition on test particle fission adumbrated above. Perhaps two additional comments
on it are in order. First, that the net force at an event is unique is entirely compatible
with the nonlinear nature of the Einstein field equation. When a spacetime metric is given,
supposing that certain timelike curves do or do not represent test particles does not affect
this, since by definition these particles do not contribute to the energy-momentum tensor.
Second, this force doesn’t need to be a local function (although most considered in physics
are), and may depend on the existence of other test particles, their properties, and the
relations between them. But once these are fixed, the net force that a particle experiences
should be uniquely specified.
The third commitment is perhaps the most subtle of the three. It is a commitment
both about scientific representation, and the metaphysics of test particles. In the first place,
it takes the image of a timelike curve to contain all the representational structure of that
curve: two curves with the same images have the same representational capacities [15],
and further information about those curves—their parameterizations—does not make them
better representations of test particle, because there is no further structure thereby imputed
that was not already with the image of the curve itself. In the second place, test particles
maintain their intrinsic properties—mass, charge, etc.—for their whole worldlines. That the
worldline of a particle contains a certain event means that the particle’s properties at that
event are given once and for all: there is no sense in which the event is doubly occupied
by the particle with different properties, except perhaps when it has different trajectories
through that event (although even that might be disputed), as would be modeled by a CTC
with a kink. Put another way, a test particle can only interpenetrate itself—or, different
temporal stages of a particle can only interpenentate—when distinct instantaneous velocities
are involved.
When the particles’s worldline extends in both directions of its parameterization beyond
an event of interpenetration, forming an “X-shape,” a question may arise regarding how
from the image of the curve alone one can describe whether the particle passed through
itself at this event, or whether it lead to a collision. However, unless the kinematics for the
test particle—that is, a specification of disposition to rebound from particles of the same
type—are given separately, this question is simply ill-posed under this third commitment.
There is no fact of the matter whether there was a collision because such information is not
represented in the image of the curve representing the worldline of the particle. One’s mental
9 In addition, given any coordinate system containing the branching, at least one cannot be described as
an analytic function in those coordinates.
10 I emphasize that these must be “free” light rays because of course the presence of refractive media can
make a difference—cf. the long quotation by Malament in section 1.2.
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picture of collisions typically involves extended objects with different properties, while the
allegedly possible collisions in the case at hand involve point particles with the same intrinsic
properties—and not even different point particles, at that! Of course, if the allowance for
interpenetration were curtailed to avoid these issues, it would not ameliorate the conceptual
inconsistency; thus, it is not an essential aspect of the third commitment. Nevertheless, this
commitment might be challenged on other grounds, which two of the resolutions described
in the next section do.
3 Three Resolutions
In this section I consider three possible resolutions of the conceptual inconsistency revealed
in the previous section. The first accepts the three commitments but restricts interpretive
principle (C1) . The second modifies the third commitment to allow for test particles to have
more structure than is represented by the image of a timelike worldline and the assignment
of intrinsic properties thereto. The third rejects an aspect of the first commitment by
dropping ontological commitment to test particles altogether in favor of fields. This allows, in
principle, for the kind of field distribution that one might construe as “particle fission” under
an idealized description. Each of these has implications for the foundations, interpretation,
or ontology of relativity theory, the lattermost of which I discuss in the concluding section 4.
Although I see the third approach as the most promising, I do not have conclusive arguments
against the other two. So, instead of advocating for a single resolution above the others, I
urge instead for further research.
3.1 Acceptance
The first resolution is simply to accept the three commitments leading to conceptual incon-
sistency, but deny that branching curves can represent the worldlines of possible massive
test particles. This is, in a sense, the most ontologically conservative resolution, for the
only modification that it makes to the interpretation of general relativity is a restriction of
interpretative principle (C1). Namely, given an oriented, regular, piecewise smooth curve or
curve segment γ,
(C1*) γ is timelike and non-branching iff γ[I] could be the worldline of a point particle
with positive mass.
Since the worldlines newly excluded by this restricted interpretive principle constitute only
a strict subset of the curves containing CTCs, it will be attractive to those wary of CTCs
in the first place. That said, the repercussions of this change throughout the theory need
further exploration. Are there any theorems about models of general relativity, or particular
constructions or calculations, that depend on the existence of branching timelike curves?
3.2 Structured Test Particles
The second resolution is to deny part of the third commitment leading to conceptual incon-
sistency, namely that the image of a timelike curve contains all the representational structure
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of that curve, and hence that massive text particles must maintain their intrinsic properties
across their whole worldline. In particular, it affirms that the parameterization of a timelike
curve represents more detail about a particle worldline than the image of the curve alone.
It does not deny that identical images of timelike curves have the same representational
capacities, but asserts rather that different timelike curves with the same image can in fact
have inequivalent representational capacities. This is the sense in which this resolution adds
additional structure to test particle worldlines.
In more detail, two parameterized timelike curves are considered representationally equiv-
alent on this proposal just when they both have the same image, and can be reparameterized
by arc length so that their domains are related by a constant shift. In more formal detail,
γ1 : I1 → M and γ2 : I2 → M are representationally equivalent in the spacetime (M, gab) if
and only if γ1[I1] = γ2[I2] and there exist diffeomorphisms α1 : I
′
1 → I1 and α2 : I ′2 → I2 such
that γ1◦α1 and γ2◦α2 are parameterized by their arc length according to gab, and there exists
a constant a ∈ R such that I ′1 + a = {(b + a) ∈ R : b ∈ I ′1} = I ′2. By contrast, according
to the third commitment, only the first condition (of equality of images) is employed for
representational equivalence.
For timelike curves not containing CTCs, the two characterizations of the representa-
tional capacities of timelike curves are equivalent. They only differ for curves containing
CTCs. For instance, consider the smooth CTCs γ1 : [0, 1] → M and γ∞ : R → M param-
eterized by arc length, whose shared image γ1[[0, 1]] = γ∞[R] is homeomorphic to S1 and
of magnitude 1 according to the spacetime metric. According to the third commitment,
they are representationally equivalent, but not so according to the second resolution under
discussion. According to this proposal, γ1 represents a possible massive particle that “tra-
verses” the smooth closed loop of its wordline once (before encountering its beginning and
overlapping itself only at the single event γ1(0) = γ1(1)), while γ∞ “traverses” that loop
countably infinitely many times, representing countably infinitely many interpenetrations
with itself. Because now more of the structure of the curve’s domain is representational,
there are more possibilities for test particles. For example, the properties of a particle may
change over distinct “traversals” of the same CTC. Because these properties may change, it
is no longer the case that a particle with a given trajectory at an event must experience the
same net force that an “earlier” or “later” state thereof does, despite their interpenetration
at the same event. There is a tendency already to accept that for a CTC with a kink, the
kink represents an event at which the particle interpenetrates itself with a different trajec-
tory. The current proposal just extends the range of this acceptance to more properties and
events.
Usually in a model of relativity theory, one understands all the worldly facts—facts
about the spacetime and its represented “contents”—to be determined through the spacetime
manifold and various fields thereon. The sense in which this is still true under the present
proposal is a bit looser. Facts about, e.g., the time elapsed along a massive particle’s wordline
do not just depend on the events that worldline occupies, but how many times that event is
occupied. However, the more times an event is occupied by a particle, the more strained does
the test particle idealization seem. For curves such as γ∞ representing countably infinitely
many massive text particles—or, perhaps more precisely, interpenetrations of temporal stages
of the same immortal particle—at any point of its image, the idealization becomes essential
to foreclose inconsistency. In particular, it is unclear what to make of such a situation if
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one takes test particles merely to be useful idealizations of fields. Taking seriously a field
ontology indeed concerns the next resolution.
3.3 Fields
The third resolution is, in the first place, to deny part of the first commitment leading to
conceptual inconsistency, namely the prohibition on particle fission. By itself, simply denying
this prohibition will not provide resolution unless one also provides details about how doing
so makes the usual uniqueness theorems for the equation of motion of a particle moot. What’s
added in this resolution is the replacement of a particle ontology with a field ontology, and the
concomitant changes in the representational commitments that the formalism of relativity
theory makes—in particular, the commitments made with curves. Because the second and
third commitments make reference to particles, this resolution modifies them, too. If there
are no particles, then the tangent vectors which enter into Newton’s second law (equation
5) do not represent the trajectories of persisting particles, or really any persisting objects at
all. Moreover, without particles one cannot attribute net forces to particles, either. Thus
by denying that branching curves represent particles at all, the uniqueness claim for particle
trajectories is unsupported by an existence claim. In a word, there is no contradiction in
asserting that particles have unique solutions to their initial value problem, and that they
can be represented by branching worldlines, if one denies that there are truly any particles
at all. The seeming inconsistency, according to this resolution, arises solely from distortions
introduced by idealizing certain field distributions as particles. Like with the first resolution,
however, this requires some revision of interpretive principle (C1).
In more detail: According to a field ontology, matter in general and test particles in
particular are represented by field distributions over spacetime points. Particles, as repre-
sented by the images of curves, are solely idealized objects, simplified surrogates for highly
concentrated field distributions that, in local coordinate charts, can be approximated by
timelike curve segments farther away from which the field is relatively vanishing. Thus, a
branching worldline could well be a fine idealized representation of a field distribution whose
concentration does indeed branch in spacetime (perhaps due to the interaction with and an-
other field). This need not entail any incompatibility with energy-momentum conservation,
as long as the equations of motion for the field (including perhaps its interactions with other
fields) ensure its satisfaction.
With a field ontology, timelike curves can play at least two representational roles, the
second involving more commitments than the first. First, they trace point-like processes
within the field, the evolution of field values within the curve’s image. The tangent vector
of such a curve does not represent the four-velocity of the field or process in any significant
sense; it rather just picks out how the events consituting the process described are related
to one another in spacetime. That is, instead of being a dynamical property of a field, it is a
part of the means of description for a process within the field. Analogously, one can describe
a series of landmarks on a map by selecting one and a series of distance vectors that, when
added sequentially to the initial landmark, pick out the rest of the series. The vectors are
a means for describing the series of landmarks, but are not dynamical properties of some
underlying material object to which one is committed.
A further representational role for curves in the context of a field ontology is for tracing
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not just any process within the field, but one around which the field is highly concentrated.
(What technical conditions are needed for this I will leave to one side, since their details don’t
play a role in the argument here; see the discussion in Weatherall [46].) In this case, one
may introduce test particles as a kind of emergent, idealized object in the theory. They are
emergent in the sense that they are not found at all in a field ontology, and idealized in the
sense that they can be described as limit objects of sequences of increasingly concentrated
fields. But like with other idealized objects in physics—infinite planes, homogeneous fields,
etc.—they do not abide by all the rules that non-idealized objects must [34]. That they do
not raises no conceptual inconsistency for the rest of the theory.
For instance, it is sensible to describe the forces acting on a particle, even as an idealized
object, when doing so is useful for prediction or explanation. In this sense commitment
two can still hold for a field ontology, but only when the test particle idealization applies
and only in this idealized sense. When it does not, the first commitment, Newton’s second
law (equation 5), is vacuous because tangent vectors are not defined for field distributions
that cannot be idealized as curves. Most importantly, in the case of branching curves,
no conceptual inconsistency arises because there is no sense in which the evolution of an
extended field at an event depends on its changing momentum (“net force”) there.
One advantage of this resolution is that it better coheres with our best theories of
matter—field theories. Indeed, general relativity is hospitable for field-like matter and un-
friendly to true particles. There is hardly any adequate way to de-idealize massive test par-
ticles into particles—that is, allow for them to contribute to the energy-momentum tensor—
due to the infinite concentrations of mass they suppose and the problems for dynamics this
entails [46]. Rather, it seems better to consider them truly as field concentrations, as this
resolution urges.
Yet that advantage also issues a challenge to the foundations of relativity theory. As was
evident in interpretive principles (C1) and (C2), the interpretation of the mathematics of
relativity theory is in terms of test particles. If one rejects test particles for fields, it would
behoove one also to recast these interpretive principles in terms of fields. Fortunately, the
two roles for test particles within a field ontology discussed above explain the delimited scope
of efficacy of (C1) as an interpretive principle while also suggesting a modification. Namely,
given an oriented, regular, piecewise smooth curve or curve segment γ,
(C1**) γ is timelike iff γ[I] could be a process of a matter field.
Which of those processes can be idealized as test particles will depends on one’s precise crite-
ria for approximation and localization. A process itself is a (piecewise) smoothly connected,
locally linear causal sequence of events that register properties of the matter field—its field
values.
Reinterpreting worldlines as field processes will require further reconceptualization of the
foundations of relativity theory, but the suggestion is not unprecedented. For instance, Hawk-
ing and Ellis [24, p. 60] initially describe their interpretive postulate of “local causality”—
analogous to a combination of (C1) and (C2)—in terms similar to those principles:
The equations governing matter fields must be such that if U is a convex normal
neighborhood and p and q are points in U then a signal can be sent in U between
p and q if and only if p and q can be joined by a C1 curve lying entirely in U ,
whose tangent vector is everywhere non-zero and is either timelike or null;
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the interpretive division of timelike and null curves arises from more direct consideration of
relativistic kinematics and the optical limit of solutions to the Einstein-Maxwell equations,
respectively. Instead of referring to test particles or light rays, however, they describe objects
functionally and ambiguously in terms of “signals.” They recognize and ameliorate the
ambiguity immediately:
A more precise statement of this postulate can be given in terms of the Cauchy
problem of the matter fields. Let p ∈ U be such that every non-spacelike curve
through p intersects the spacelike surface x4 = 0 within U . Let F be the set
of points in the surface x4 = 0 which can be reached by non-spacelike curves in
U from p. Then we require that the values of the matter fields at p must be
uniquely determined by the values of the fields and their derivatives up to some
finite order on F , and that they are not unqiuely determined by the values on
any proper subset of F to which it can be continuously retracted. [24, p. 60]
Signals or test particles have been replaced by fields, and the role of non-spacelike curves is
to understand the causal connection between field values at an event and those at certain
other collections of events—Cauchy surfaces, in particular. The sense in which the timelike
and null directions are distinguished are not in terms of possible particle trajectories, but
rather the directions of causal dependence in the sense given by the Cauchy problem. A
process, represented by a timelike (or null) curve, is not an independently existing object in
a spacetime but is rather a property or aspect of a matter field. This abides with similar
suggestions concerning the application of the geodesic principle to true massive particles [46].
Exploring this idea further suggests natural corollaries for the ontology of spacetime events,
which I explore in the next section.
4 Implications for Ontology
Among the three resolutions of the conceptual inconsistency presented in section 3, the first
has no apparent ontological implications for relativity theory, but some representational
implications: one doesn’t change anything about test particles except for narrowing which
curves can represent them. The second has minor ontological implications and moderate
representational implications: particles have a greater range of properties than they could
on the first resolution, and are represented by finer-grained equivalence classes of curves.
The third resolution’s implications are more substantial for ontology, but less for represen-
tation. All oriented, regular, piecewise smooth timelike curves and curve segments still play
a representational role, but what they represent is different: processes of matter fields in-
stead of histories of point test particles. These implications have synergistic correlates with
the ontology of spacetime itself, which I had set aside in the introductory section. In this
concluding section, I return to them before ending with how considerations from quantum
theory impact the assessment of these resolutions.
4.1 Spacetime
If timelike curves are possible processes of matter fields, what is the relationship between
these processes and events? More generally, what is the relationship between matter fields,
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processes, and events? Here I sketch two sorts of answers to these questions, answers which
differ according to which sorts of entity they take as fundamental and which as derivative.
The first sort of answer makes processes and events more fundamental than matter fields.
For instance, Whitehead [49, 50] and Russell [42, 43] take, in slightly different ways, matter
to be participants in or properties of events. They do not however engage in detail with
the question of how this ontological project interfaces with relativity theory. Mayr [32] and
Romero [38, 37] do so more explicitly, the former taking processes as fundamental while
the latter taking events instead.11 Of the two, only Romero [38] discusses substantively the
relation between events, processes, and matter: objects are collections (“bundles”) of events
with particular shared properties. These events form the basic substance of the world [37].
This first sort of answer is essentially indifferent to whether one adopts a particle or field
ontology for matter, since according to it, events maintain their modal properties of being
possible sites of material coincidences, whatever form they may take. However, if one does
adopt a field ontology a second answer becomes possible. According to this second answer,
it is matter fields which are more fundamental than spacetime events, so that these events
are, in a sense, properties of the fields. Many have made and rediscovered this suggestion
[45, 2, 3, 40, 41, 9, 47, 48], with the events that all fields share sometimes called “point-
coincidences,” often inspired by a famous quotation by Einstein [13, p. 155–6]: “Space-
time does not claim an existence of its own, but only as a structural quality of the field.”
Einstein’s aspirations for a unified field theory distinguish his singular use of “field” and
answers a potential objection, that the fact that all fields have the same event/coincidence
properties goes unexplained. (If there is ultimately only one field, there is no coincidence to
explain.) An additional advantage of this answer is that it involves a lower grade of modal
commitment for events: no event is truly empty in a spacetime, merely a possible site for
matter, but is instead always a property of some actual field (regardless of whether that
field is explicitly modeled in the spacetime model). These advantages accrue whether one
considers such an ontology as relational, which most making the suggestion have argued
[45, 40, 41, 8, 9, 47, 48], ultimately substantival, which other have objected [6], or not fitting
neatly into either philosophical category [2, 3].
4.2 Quantum Intimations
Up until this point I have restricted attention to classical general relativity. There has been
some conceptual advantage in doing so. In the first place, it is important to interpret our best
theories with thoroughness unencumbered by the uncertain flux at the vanguard of research.
Second, it evades the vexed question of a completely adequate theory of quantum gravity.
But new theories also shine clearer interpretive light on hidden aspects of old theories, as
general relativity has done with Newtonian gravitation [26], for example, or QED with
classical electromagnetism [5]. So it is worth considering how the developments of quantum
gravity and quantum theory more general bear on the three resolutions I have put forward.
For the most part, these developments favor the third resolution. Many of those advo-
cating for a field ontology according to which spacetime is a property of the material field(s)
11 Whitehead, Russell, and Mayr are all concerned to construct simple events (i.e., those without parts)
as, essentially, direct limits of series of nested processes. Their motivation comes, in part, from the empirical
inaccessibility of such simple events. But for present purposes these differing motivations can be set aside.
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do so with arguments based in quantum mechanics [8], quantum field theory [2, 8, 9], or
loop quantum gravity [40, 41]. But one need not accept the second answer to the spacetime
ontology question of the previous subsection to find support. Among those who take events
to be ontologically more fundamental than matter also see fields, understood as proper-
ties of events, as more compatible with quantum mechanics [11], quantum field theory [22],
and causal set theory [38, 37]. Indeed, even those not principally concerned with spacetime
ontology take our best theories of matter, quantum field theories, to provide for a field ontol-
ogy, while any particle ontology (required by the first two resolutions) is highly problematic
[18, 25]. If our best interpretation of general relativity is to be compatible therewith, then
the third resolution is thereby favored.
Not all agree however that our best physical theories favor fields over particles, whether
for quantum field theory [4] or even classical field theory [28]. Those who do not have either
of the first two resolutions at their disposal. So whatever ontological whispers one discerns
and interprets from quantum theory, at least one of the three resolutions to the conceptual
inconsistency in relativity theory remains viable.12
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